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Abstract: This paper is about how to aggregate outside opinion. If two experts are on one 
side of an issue, while three experts are on the other side, what should a non-expert be-
lieve? Certainly, the non-expert should take into account more than just the numbers. But 
which other factors are relevant, and why? According to the view developed here, one 
important factor is whether the experts should have been expected, in advance, to reach 
the same conclusion. When the agreement of two (or of twenty) thinkers can be predicted 
with certainty in advance, their shared belief is worth only as much as one of their beliefs 
would be worth alone. This expectational model of belief dependence can be applied 
whether we think in terms of credences or in terms of all-or-nothing beliefs. 
1 Introduction 
While taking a logic exam, you encounter a problem you don’t know how to do. So you 
decide to cheat. Your friends Anna, Beth, and Chad are seated close by, and you know 
that they are all quite good at logic – about equally good, in fact. You peek at their an-
swers and find that they did not all agree: Anna answered not-p; Beth and Chad an-
swered p. What do you do? 
Other things the same, it seems clear that you should go with p. You have two relia-
ble sources against one. But suppose that you saw Chad copy off of Beth. Given this in-
formation, it seems clear that you do not have reason to favor p. Even though the case 
can still be described as ‘two against one,’ Chad's opinion is dependent on Beth's, in some 
important sense. And, for this reason, it seems to lack epistemic significance (that is, it 
seems not to provide additional support for p beyond that provided by Beth's opinion). 
To accommodate cases of this kind, we might offer the following general principle: 
When one opinion is totally dependent on another, the dependent opinion does not pro-
vide any additional support for the jointly held proposition.  
It is difficult, however, to characterize precisely the type of belief dependence that 
can play this epistemic role. Lackey (2013) canvasses various attempts to capture the rel-
evant type of dependence, arguing that all are unsuccessful. Ultimately, she goes a step 
farther, boldly rejecting the received view that completely dependent opinions lack epis-
temic significance. This paper has two goals. The first is to defend the received view 
from Lackey’s thought-provoking critique. The second is to offer an account of belief 
dependence – that is, an account of when additional opinions count and when they do 
not. The account offered is expectational: According to it, one opinion is (completely) 
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dependent on another when learning about the latter allows one to predict the former 
(with certainty). Later, we will see that this expectational account can be extended to 
cover partial dependence and independence and that it can be applied regardless of 
whether we understand a person’s opinions in terms all-or-nothing beliefs or in terms of 
credences. Before exploring such subtleties, though, we must say a bit more to motivate 
investigation into this issue. 
2 The Importance of Belief Dependence 
One reason to care about this issue is its connection to disagreements involving shared 
evidence – a topic that has received substantial attention. Much of that controversy turns 
on just how we should see the interaction between ordinary evidence (e.g. the infor-
mation given in the logic problem) and the evidence provided by the opinions of others. 
On the one hand, ‘conciliatory’ views demand that a person revise her opinion when she 
encounters disagreement from a reliable source who shares her evidence – even if she 
had in fact responded perfectly to the shared evidence in the first place. On the other 
hand, ‘steadfast’ views hold that those who actually respond correctly to the shared evi-
dence should not revise their beliefs in light of disagreement.  
 Given this distinction between views, it is tempting to think that the interest of the 
belief dependence issue is limited to conciliationists. But this is a mistake. Virtually eve-
ryone, whether conciliationist or not, should allow that outside opinions can have some 
evidential force, when such opinions are the only evidence a person has about some 
proposition. (Everyone should allow, for example, that a reliable meteorologist’s predic-
tions, other things equal, provides some evidence about whether it will rain.) As long as 
one admits that outside opinions can provide evidence sometimes, one will need to be 
able to handle questions involving belief dependence. We can ask, for example: How 
much more evidence is provided by the agreement of independent experts than is pro-
vided by that of dependent experts? So questions surrounding dependence are not just 
of interest to conciliationists; they should be taken seriously more generally. 
In order to focus on the issue directly, we will concentrate on cases that allow us to 
stay neutral on how to adjudicate the disagreement debate. So, for instance, in the logic 
exam case, we will not ask: What should Anna think, in light of the information given in 
the logic problem and the disagreement from Beth and Chad? Answering this question 
would require us first to decide what Anna should think, in light of the logic problem 
information and disagreement from Beth alone, which is a controversial matter. Instead, 
we will ask: What should an outsider think, given Anna's, Beth's, and Chad's opinions, 
and importantly setting aside any evidence provided by the logic problem itself?1 
                                                
1 In the original story, we imagined that you had seen the logic problem but were unsure how 
to solve it. In the cleanest version of the case, we‘d stipulate that you had not even seen the logic 
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3 Lackey’s Argument 
In the logic exam case, it seems clear that Chad's opinion should not count for much, if it 
really is true that he simply copied off of Beth. On the basis of this judgment, it seems 
reasonable to posit the following general principle:  
Belief Dependence: When one opinion is totally dependent on another, the dependent opin-
ion does not confer any additional support for the jointly held proposition. 
Precedent for such a principle is easy to find. Here is Elga: 
[A]n additional outside opinion should move one only to the extent that one counts it as in-
dependent from opinions one has already taken into account. (2010, p. 177) 
Elga regards this claim as “completely uncontroversial” and suggests that “every sensi-
ble view on disagreement should accommodate it” (2010, p. 178). Kelly, writing from the 
other side of the disagreement debate, shares Elga’s outlook: 
[E]ven in cases in which opinion is sharply divided among a large number of generally relia-
ble individuals, it would be a mistake to be impressed by the sheer numbers on both sides of 
the issue. For numbers mean little in the absence of independence. (2010, p. 148) 
But despite the widespread appeal of Belief Dependence, Lackey (2013) argues, persua-
sively, that it is tricky to characterize the type of dependence operative in this principle. 
Indeed, she goes a step further, suggesting that there is simply no good way to do it. 
Let’s take a look at Lackey’s argument. 
Lackey restricts her attention to cases involving epistemic peers (who, for Lackey, are 
“evidential and cognitive equals” with respect to the issue at hand2). On the face of it, it 
may seem strange to invoke peerhood here. After all, Belief Dependence states simply 
that if one person’s belief is dependent on another person’s, then the dependent belief 
does not confer additional support for the opinion shared. Peerhood seems irrelevant to 
the issue.  
Though Lackey does not explain why this restriction is imposed, there is a compel-
ling rationale for it. In assessing the import of incoming opinions, it important to distin-
guish two questions: (1) How strong are the respective epistemic credentials of the 
sources of these opinions? (2) To what extent do these sources depend on each other in 
their thinking? Since, presumably, the relevant sort of dependence can occur when the 
involved people are on equal epistemic footing, it seems better, methodologically, to fo-
cus on cases of this type. Framing the question in terms of epistemic peers allows us to 
                                                                                                                                            
problem but were still trying to determine its solution through the efforts of your classmates. 
2 See Lackey (pp. 243-245). We’ll discuss the role this assumption plays in the following sec-
tion.  
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control for a confounding variable. So, following Lackey, let us focus on a more restrict-
ed version of Belief Dependence: 
Belief Dependence for Peers: When a person’s opinion is totally dependent on the opinion 
of an epistemic peer, the dependent opinion does not confer any additional support for the 
jointly held proposition. 
Lackey considers several ways one might try to understand this notion of dependence so 
as to render the principle true.3 But she argues that each is no good, for reasons we will 
see shortly. Ultimately, Lackey argues that this widely held principle cannot be sus-
tained, suggesting instead that dependent beliefs do tend to confer additional support: 
I shall show that where one disagrees with two (or more) epistemic peers, the beliefs of those 
peers can be dependent in the relevant sense and yet one cannot rationally regard this as a 
single instance of disagreement when engaging in doxastic revision. (2013, p. 245) 
It would seem that Lackey is flat out rejecting the intuition elicited by the logic exam 
case – provided that peerhood between Beth and Chad is stipulated. With peerhood in 
place, Lackey’s view seems to entail that, contra appearances, Chad's opinion, together 
with Beth's, somehow counts for more than Beth's opinion does alone. And if we add 
that Anna, too, is a peer of Beth and of Chad, then it seems to follow that you, the cheat-
er, would have reason to favor Beth and Chad's joint answer (not-p) over Anna’s answer 
(p) – even if you were certain that Chad got his answer directly from Beth. 
Lackey offers an intriguing diagnosis of this result. She points out that the case is 
underdescribed. Though we know that Chad's opinion was, in some sense, grounded in 
Beth's, we are not told whether Chad was at all critical in his decision to endorse Beth's 
opinion. Here, Lackey distinguishes what she calls autonomous and non-autonomous de-
pendence: 
The autonomous version of this dependence involves a subject exercising agency in her reli-
ance on a source of information, critically assessing its reliability, monitoring for defeaters, 
                                                
3 It is worth noting that Lackey’s version of the principle is slightly different: 
When A disagrees with peers B, C, and so on, with respect to a given question and A has already ra-
tionally taken into account the disagreement with B, A’s disagreement with C, and so on, requires dox-
astic revision for A only if the beliefs of C, and so on, are independent of B’s belief. (2013, p. 244) 
This version is more closely intertwined with the issue of disagreements involving shared evi-
When A disagrees with peers B, C, and so on, with respect to a given question and A has already ra-
tionally taken into account the disagreement with B, A’s disagreement with C, and so on, requires dox-
astic revision for A only if the beliefs of C, and so on, are independent of B’s belief. (2013, p. 244) 
This version is more closely intertwined with the issue of disagreements involving shared evi-
dence, for A must weigh the import of incoming opinions while maintaining her own point of 
view. In this paper, we set this complication to the side. Lackey’s arguments apply equally to 
both versions of the principle. 
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and comparing the content of the belief that she forms with her background beliefs. This, I 
take it, is the minimum required for rational belief formation. (2013, p. 249) 
Applying this distinction to the case at hand presents two possibilities: Either Chad was 
autonomous in his reliance on Beth or he was not. Whichever way we go, Lackey thinks, 
we will not need to endorse anything like Belief Dependence for Peers to deliver the cor-
rect verdict. 
First, suppose Chad was autonomous in his decision to copy Beth. So we can pre-
sume either that Chad engaged in some double-checking of Beth's answer or, at the very 
least, that he thought about whether Beth was a reliable source, prior to copying her. 
Consider each option in turn.  
Double checking: If Chad engaged in a bit of double-checking before endorsing Beth's 
answer of not-p, then it seems plausible that his agreement does confer at least some ad-
ditional support upon the answer they both favor. After all, Anna's answer was not 
double-checked, and it seems clear that a double-checked answer is a better bet than an 
un-double-checked one, from an outside point of view. So Chad's opinion must be 
providing some support of its own. 
Copying a vetted source: What if Chad did not double-check Beth's answer, but did at 
least confirm Beth's reliability before resolving to trust her? Here, too, we can make it 
plausible that Chad's agreement should carry some epistemic weight. To see this, imag-
ine, realistically, that your own reliability assessments of Anna and of Beth are less than 
certain: You have good reason to regard each as reliable, but you recognize that these 
assessments may be off base. Under these conditions, learning that Chad agreed with 
Beth is evidence that Chad assessed Beth's reliability favorably – which does seem to 
render their shared opinion at least slightly more credible than Anna's opinion. After all, 
we now have more evidence for Beth's reliability than we do for Anna's. 
In either case, we find that – so long as Chad's reliance on Beth was autonomous – 
Chad's apparently dependent opinion seems still to have some epistemic significance.4 
But what if Chad's reliance on Beth was not autonomous? What if, to use Lackey’s term, 
Chad simply parroted Beth? Here, Lackey agrees that Chad's opinion does not provide 
additional support for the position he and Beth share. But Lackey notes that we do not 
need to appeal to Belief Dependence for Peers to explain this. Since Chad is non-
autonomous in his reliance on Beth, he would defer to her even if she were thoroughly 
unreliable; he would adopt her beliefs even if they were patently false. On this issue, 
                                                
4 One could object that, by making Chad's reliance autonomous, we have rendered his opin-
ion at least partially independent of Beth's. I am sympathetic to this point of view; section 6 dis-
cusses an account of belief dependence that can deliver this result. However, I still see an intui-
tive sense in which Chad's opinions still are dependent on Beth's (e.g. causally), and, in this sense, 
Lackey’s verdict seems to be exactly right. 
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Chad's belief-forming process is manifestly irrational. And, for Lackey, this makes it the 
case that Chad is not a peer of Anna or Beth – in which case, the situation is irrelevant to 
the principle at issue (2013, p. 253). Lackey also considers what would happen if we 
stipulate that Anna and Beth are just as irrational as Chad. In such a case, she points out 
that none of their opinions would have much epistemic significance at all, for reasons 
that have little to do with belief dependence. The key point is that – no matter how we 
describe the case – we do not need to invoke anything like Belief Dependence for Peers 
to explain why Chad’s parroted opinion lacks epistemic significance. 
The logic exam case seemed to illustrate the need for some kind of Belief Depend-
ence principle. Taking into account Lackey’s insights, it is not clear that such a principle 
is needed to accommodate this case. More generally, it is tempting to think that we can 
get by without ever appealing to Belief Dependence – at least in cases involving epistem-
ic peers.5 The next section discusses some reasons for thinking that we do still need a 
principle closely resembling Belief Dependence while respecting Lackey’s observations.  
4 Rationality, Accuracy, and Dependence 
There is something attractive about the argument discussed in the previous section. In 
many cases that seem, at first, to exhibit a problematic sort of belief dependence, the dis-
tinction between autonomous and non-autonomous dependence is an important one to 
draw. But the argument deserves a bit more scrutiny. In particular, it is important to 
note a way in which the argument depends on a particular conception of epistemic 
peerhood.  
Christensen (2014) distinguishes two ways to think about epistemic peerhood: Two 
people are said to be rationality peers, with respect to some issue, if and only if they are 
equally likely to form rational beliefs about that issue; In contrast, two people are said to 
be accuracy peers, with respect to some issue, if and only if they are equally likely to 
form accurate beliefs about that issue (2014, p. 586). 
Of course, these two notions will quite often coincide, since, presumably, rational be-
liefs tend to be accurate. Rationality peers tend to be accuracy peers, and vice versa. But 
the two notions can come apart. Compare two math students – one who solves certain 
problems properly and correctly, and another who regularly commits a pair of errors 
that cancel each other out. The two students might well be accuracy peers (scoring 
                                                
5 One way to react to Lackey’s argument is to retreat to a weaker thesis: To the extent that one 
opinion is dependent on another, the dependent opinion provides less additional support for the 
jointly held proposition. Lackey rejects even this more cautious formulation of the position, sug-
gesting that “the amount of doxastic revision required in the face of disagreement does not track 
the amount of independence possessed by the target belief” (p. 265). We set this issue aside, as, in 
the end, the paper will aim to salvage a position resembling the original, unweakened, Belief De-
pendence. 
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equally well on exams, perhaps) without being rationality peers (since one of them 
makes so many mistakes). 
Let us apply this distinction to one step of Lackey’s argument. Return to the case in 
which Chad copies Beth non-autonomously. That is, he copies her opinion blindly – 
without any regard to her reliability and without any regard to the plausibility of the 
belief copied. Further, let’s suppose that Beth, unlike Chad, is quite rational and reliable 
in her thinking about the relevant sort of issues. Given these details, the intuition elicited 
is clear: Chad's “parroted” opinion adds nothing to Beth's. 
Lackey’s answer to this case was to point out that Chad and Beth are not epistemic 
peers (rendering the case irrelevant to the principle under consideration). If we are 
thinking about rationality peerhood, then Lackey’s answer seems just right: Chad and 
Beth are not equally likely to form rational beliefs about the relevant issue. But, if instead 
we are thinking about accuracy peerhood, then we will have to say that Chad and Beth 
are epistemic peers, with respect to the relevant issue, since the two are bound to be 
equally accurate, given the setup. So the argument against Belief Dependence is unsuc-
cessful, if an accuracy-based notion of peerhood is assumed.  
Importantly, this observation isn’t a major objection to Lackey’s argument: Lackey 
goes in for a rationality-based notion of peerhood explicitly (2013, p. 243). But since 
some of the targets of her critique – such as Elga (2010) – do favor accuracy-based no-
tions of peerhood, it is worth observing how both varieties of peerhood interact with 
belief dependence.  
The first lesson, then, is that whether a Belief Dependence principle is required to 
explain ‘parrot cases’ will depend on which type of epistemic peerhood we employ. If 
we think in terms of rationality, then we may be able to explain why parroted opinions 
lack epistemic significance without appealing to any Belief Dependence principle. But if 
we think terms of accuracy, then such a principle does seem necessary to deliver the cor-
rect verdicts in such cases. 
At this point, one might wonder: Are parrot cases the only cases that call for (or at 
least allow for) some kind of appeal to Belief Dependence in order to derive the intuitive 
verdict? If this is so, we may be able to get by without ever invoking this principle, simp-
ly by insisting on rationality-based measures of epistemic credibility. But as it turns out, 
there are cases that demand some kind of appeal to Belief Dependence which do not re-
quire us to think in terms of accuracy to appreciate their force.  
5 The Indispensability of Belief Dependence 
Consider the following (highly unrealistic) case. 
Chicken-Sexing: A chicken-sexing heuristic is a reliable, but fallible method that can be used to 
discern the sex of a chicken by examining a certain superficial fact about how it looks or 
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moves. 
Dawn knows a heuristic – method A – that uses the chicken’s head movements as a 
guide. Millions of other people know a different heuristic – method B – that uses the chick-
en’s strut as a guide. Everyone has equal evidence for the efficacy of their respective method. 
As it happens, both method A and method B are 90% reliable at determining a given chick-
en’s sex. 
A chicken walks by. Dawn, using her method, judges it to be female. Everyone else, us-
ing the other method, looks at the same chicken and judges it to be male. You’re staring at the 
chicken and have no idea which sex it is. You do not know how to apply either method, but 
you do know all of the above information. How confident are you that the chicken is male? 
Not 99.9999% confident, presumably. Despite that you have millions on one side and 
only one person on the other, it seems clear that the chicken could quite easily be male 
or female. Indeed, if we idealize the case so that you are certain both heuristics can never 
be misapplied, then we can make it reasonable for you to afford equal confidence to the 
female and male hypotheses. 
Here is an argument for this result. Given the assumptions made, it is certain that 
each heuristic was correctly applied. In this case, they produced divergent judgments. It 
follows that one of the heuristics gets this chicken wrong. Presumably, there are some 
chickens that are misclassified by method A but not by method B while there are other 
chickens that are misclassified by method B but not by method A. There must be about 
as many chickens in each of these groups – otherwise one of the two methods would be 
more reliable than the other. Absent any reason to suspect that the mystery chicken was 
pulled from one of these groups, it is reasonable to split one’s confidence equally be-
tween both options.  
If we trust this result, it is worth exploring how it bears on the issue of belief de-
pendence. For it is clear that all of the chicken-sexers in the story are epistemic peers 
with respect to chicken-sexing – both accuracy-wise and rationality-wise. If it were really 
true that numbers mattered, even in the absence of independence, then we would be 
forced to conclude that the male hypothesis was somehow more credible in the imag-
ined situation. Since this is not a very plausible result, it seems that we will want to hold 
onto some version of Belief Dependence to explain what is going on in a case like this. 
An opponent of Belief Dependence for Peers can push back against this case, though. 
The setup suggests that Dawn has some evidence for method A, while everyone else has 
evidence for method B. Doesn’t this imply that they have different evidence? And if so, 
wouldn’t this undermine the suggestion that the case is relevant to the principle in ques-
tion (since the involved parties are not all epistemic peers)? 
In response, there are two points worth making. First, it should be noted that one 
may be able to avoid this objection by revising the case. Suppose that all of the chicken-
sexers have access to both heuristics, but, for whatever reason, Dawn uses method A, 
-9- 
while the others all use method B. So imagined, Dawn and her counterparts may well be 
peers, despite having used different methods on this occasion.  
But leave this point aside. Even if we leave Dawn out of the story altogether, there 
still seems to be a clear need for some kind of Belief Dependence principle. For, compare 
two situations: in the first, we learn that millions of chicken-sexers (using method B) all 
judged the chicken to be male; in the second, we learn that a single chicken-sexer (using 
method B) judged the chicken to be male. If we again idealize so that method B can nev-
er be misapplied, is there any more support for the male hypothesis in the first situa-
tion? Clearly not. In both situations, it seems reasonable to have a confidence of .9 that 
the chicken is male. But this can be true only if the additional agreeing opinions confer 
no additional support. 
No matter how you slice it, we need to be able to make sense of a certain sort of be-
lief dependence – one that can render additional dependent opinions epistemically inert. 
The next section investigates the nature of this dependence. 
6 Belief Dependence6 
6.1 An Expectational Account of Complete Dependence 
Dependent beliefs do sometimes lack epistemic weight. In the chicken-sexing example, 
Dawn’s opinion is worth just as much as is the shared judgment of the many method B 
users. But an important question remains: In what sense are the opinions of the method B 
users really dependent? After all, their opinions are not necessarily causally dependent: 
These chicken-sexers may well have been causally isolated from one another, perhaps all 
discovering method B separately.7 Even if this condition is stipulated, the evidential im-
port of their shared opinion does not change. So long as we know, in advance, that they 
are using the same method (and that the method cannot be misapplied), it seems to fol-
low that their shared opinion should ‘count as one.’ 
If causal dependence is not what matters in these cases, where should we look in-
stead? Here is one angle. In determining whether two sources are dependent in the rele-
vant sense, what matters is not whether one causes the other, but rather, whether they 
                                                
6 The expectational account of dependence and independence discussed in the following sec-
tions are in broad agreement with remarks made by Jeffrey (1987, p. 392), Goldman (2001, pp. 99-
101), and Elga (2010, p. 177). The task at hand is to develop a complete account of dependence, 
independence, and everything in between – along the way exposing a number of subtleties not 
discussed by these other authors. 
7 In light of this observation, one might worry that the discussion in the previous section is 
unfair to Lackey’s position. But Lackey does not only want to reject causally-based dependence 
principles – for example, she examines and rejects Goldman’s account of dependence, which does 
not cast dependence in causal terms (pp. 257-260). And apart from questions about the details of 
Lackey’s view, it is important to emphasize the non-causal character of the type of belief depend-
ence that can serve to render agreeing opinions evidentially inert. 
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should be expected, in advance, to reach the same conclusion.8 When Chad copies Beth's an-
swer uncritically, we can see in advance that the two students will come away with the 
same opinion. In the chicken-sexing example, too, we can see in advance that all of the 
method B users will issue the same judgment about the sex of the mystery chicken. The 
best way to capture the relevant sort of dependence should, I think, appeal to this obser-
vation. With this in mind, consider the following account. 
Complete Dependence: C’s belief (about some proposition p) is completely dependent on B’s 
belief (about p) just in case, in advance,9 it is rational to be certain that C would arrive at his 
belief (about p) given that B arrived at her belief (about p). When this condition is met, the 
two beliefs will together provide just as much evidence for or against p as would be provided 
by B’s belief, on its own. 
It is worth pausing to clarify two key aspects of this view before applying it to the famil-
iar cases we have examined. First, this account of complete dependence is expectational. It 
makes essential reference to what it would be rational for someone to predict, given cer-
tain information. So, on this view, whether a given belief is completely dependent on 
another will turn on what information an evaluator possesses.  
Second, it is worth pointing out that there are different ways in which one belief can 
be dependent on another. Most commonly, complete dependence can occur when it can 
be seen in advance that two sources will inevitably agree about some proposition (e.g. 
when Chad blindly copies Beth). We can call this ordinary complete dependence. But, 
notably, complete dependence can also occur when it can be seen in advance that two 
sources will inevitably disagree about some proposition (e.g. when Chad the contrarian 
blindly negates all of Beth’s answers, perhaps – after all, knowing Beth’s opinion would 
still enable us to predict Chad’s opinion with certainty here). We can call this perverse 
complete dependence, since it is impossible for two sources to exhibit this kind of de-
pendence and still both be reliable (that is, to answer correctly more than half the time). 
Though certain forms of perverse dependence will arise later on, ordinary complete de-
pendence proves more relevant to the cases we have so far examined. 
Chicken-Sexing: Recall the chicken-sexing example. In assessing whether the joint 
opinion of the method B users should count for more than one of their opinions alone, 
we must ask: In advance, how likely was it that the method B users would all agree? 
                                                
8 Vavova (2014) makes a similar observation. There, Vavova argues that, other things equal, a 
dissenting opinion is significant to the extent that it is surprising. 
9 It is worth clarifying what is meant by the qualifier “in advance”.  The purpose of that pro-
vision is to block the following kind of reasoning: “Yes, I can predict Chad’s opinion with certain-
ty, because I already know for a fact that he ultimately came to believe p. So his opinion must be 
dependent on Beth’s.” The relevant assessment is supposed to be made in a way that sets aside 
(or “brackets”) information about what Chad actually concluded. 
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Given the setup – in particular, given that their shared heuristic cannot be misapplied – 
it was certain that they would all arrive at the same verdict. So, this is a case of complete 
dependence – and for this reason, their shared opinion counts only as heavily as any one 
of their opinions would.10 
Logic Exam – Blind copying: Recall the version of the logic exam case in which Chad 
blindly copies Beth. Chad adopts Beth’s opinion uncritically – without any regard to 
Beth’s reliability or to the plausibility of the opinion adopted. In assessing whether their 
jointly held opinion should count for more than Beth's opinion alone, we must ask: In 
advance, how likely was it that Beth and Chad would agree? Given the setup, it was cer-
tain that Chad’s opinion would match Beth’s. This is another instance of (ordinary) 
complete dependence – for this reason, their shared opinion counts only as heavily as 
Beth’s would alone. 
Each of the previous two examples clearly exhibits ordinary complete dependence. 
Considering Lackey’s variations on the simple copying example brings out important 
subtleties.  
Logic Exam – Copying with double-checking: Recall the version of the logic exam case in 
which Chad copies Beth, but only after reflecting at least somewhat critically on the so-
lution he steals from her. In assessing the significance of their shared opinion, we ask: In 
advance, how likely was it that they would agree? Here, there are two cases to consider. 
 On the one hand, we might know that when Chad double-checks a stolen answer, he 
never actually changes it. If we are aware of this fact, then this case is not importantly 
different from the blind copying case, for we will be able to see, in advance, that Chad 
and Beth will surely come away agreeing. Chad’s agreement would not confer any addi-
tional support. 
 On the other hand, we might know, somewhat more plausibly, that Chad does 
sometimes revise stolen answers during the double-checking process. Specifically, let us 
suppose that he has a 50% chance of discovering and correcting a mistake – when there 
is a mistake. Given this setup, we cannot be certain, in advance, that Beth and Chad will 
end up agreeing – since Beth may make a mistake, and Chad may find it. For this reason, 
Chad's opinion is not completely dependent upon Beth's, according to the expectational 
account. This explains why Chad's agreement with Beth – if indeed they do end up 
agreeing – would have its own epistemic significance, as Lackey rightly suggests. 
Logic Exam – Copying from a vetted source: Finally, recall what might seem to be a 
problematic version of the logic exam case. In this version, Chad copies Beth without 
                                                
10 Additionally, it is worth noting that even if we had learned about the details of the setup 
after learning about the distribution of opinions, we would still have equal reason to regard this 
as a case of complete dependence. Once we are in possession of all relevant information, we can 
see that the method B users were, in advance, sure to arrive at the same conclusion. 
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double-checking Beth's answer at all. However, Chad's deference is not totally blind, as 
he does assess Beth's reliability in general before resolving to copy her answer.  At first, 
it seems that this case is quite problematic for the account being considered. Given the 
setup, we can see in advance that Beth and Chad will come away agreeing. Nonetheless, 
as Lackey points out, it is intuitive that we would gain additional reason to trust Beth's 
answer after learning that Chad agreed with her. Isn’t this a problem? 
Despite appearances, this case actually confirms the expectational account of com-
plete dependence. There are two versions of this case. In both, we know, going in, that 
Chad will assess Beth's general reliability, resolving to copy her answer if his assessment 
is a favorable one. In one version of the case, though, we do not know, in advance, how 
Chad's reliability assessment turned out. In the other version, we know, going in, that 
Chad did deem Beth reliable. Let us discuss each version in turn. 
In the first version, Chad's agreement with Beth tells us something important. It 
gives us some evidence that Chad did assess Beth favorably. This is epistemically signif-
icant, and it may well provide additional support for Beth's answer, as Lackey suggests. 
But notice that the dependence condition is not satisfied in this case: Given the infor-
mation we had, in advance, we could not be sure that Beth and Chad would end up with 
the same opinion. Chad might have deemed Beth unreliable, in which case the two 
could have disagreed. Since there was some probability of disagreement between Beth 
and Chad, their opinions are not completely dependent. Chad's agreement – should he 
agree – can and does confer additional support. 
In the second version, we know in advance that Chad vetted Beth and found her to 
be trustworthy. This version does meet the condition provided: Given the setup, we can 
see in advance that Beth and Chad will inevitably agree. According to the view under 
consideration, it would seem to follow that Chad's agreement should not confer addi-
tional support upon Beth's answer. But this turns out to be the appropriate result. To be 
sure, Chad is providing us with a reason to be more confident of Beth's answer. But 
what is doing the work is Chad's favorable assessment of Beth – not Chad's agreement 
with her. And, importantly, these two bits of information can be pulled apart: Chad 
might be sick and miss the exam (and so he might never actually come to agree with 
Beth). Nonetheless, so long as we know that Chad assessed Beth favorably, we would 
have some reason to place more confidence in Beth's answer. Whether Chad happens to 
be healthy on the day of the exam (and is therefore able to copy Beth's answer) is eviden-
tially inert. So the expectational account handles this case effectively. 
6.2 Tricky Cases – Group Dependence and Noisy Copying11 
                                                
11 Thanks to an anonymous referee for posing questions that illustrated the need for this sec-
tion’s inclusion. 
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 In thinking about complete dependence, we are investigating a certain way in which 
opinions can be evidentially worthless. Of course, there is another way an opinion can 
fail to “count”: It may come from an unreliable source (that is, a source who is no more 
likely to answer correctly than incorrectly, given what is known). Are these the only two 
ways? It is tempting to suppose so. But we must pause to deal with two interesting 
complications to this picture. First, consider the following case, which involves depend-
ence upon a group. 
Group Dependence: Before answering a logic problem, Dawn surveys the answers of her re-
liable friends – Anna, Beth, and Chad – who all work independently. In the end, Dawn comes 
to believe whichever answer is most popular among her three friends. 
Given the setup, Dawn’s opinion is not completely dependent on Anna’s, nor on Beth’s, 
nor on Chad’s. After all, her opinion cannot be predicted (with certainty) purely on the 
basis of any single friend’s opinion. And, given the setup, it is clear that Dawn is, in gen-
eral, reliable. Indeed, she may be the most reliable member of her group.12 So Dawn’s 
opinion is not completely dependent on any other opinion, and she is reliable in general. 
Still, her opinion is worthless, so long as the other three opinions are already known. 
Provided we know, in advance, how Dawn operates, learning her opinion tells us noth-
ing new. 
 What this shows is that an opinion can be completely dependent on the opinions of a 
group without being completely dependent on the individual opinion of any one group 
member. This type of dependence is expectational, just as individual dependence is: 
One’s opinion is completely dependent upon the opinions of some group if it can be 
predicted with certainty, given full knowledge of the opinions of all group members. So 
Dawn’s opinion is completely dependent upon the group opinion, and this is why it 
does not provide additional evidence. 
 The second complication can be illustrated by way of an example involving a type of 
dependence that is mixed with random noise. 
Noisy Copying: Before answering a logic problem, Chad rolls a fair, six-sided die. If the re-
sult is anything other than a six, Chad copies Beth’s answer. If the result is a six, Chad “anti-
copies” Beth (i.e. goes with the opposite of whatever Beth put down).13 
Given the setup, Chad’s opinion is not completely dependent on Beth’s. After all, his 
opinion cannot be predicted (with certainty) solely on the basis of Beth’s opinion. And, 
given the setup, it is clear that Chad is reliable: ⅚ of the time, he copies Beth; ⅙ of the 
                                                
12 This fact relates closely to the Condorcet’s (1785) jury theorem. 
13 Estlund (1994) also discusses a case of what might be called 'Noisy copying,' though he 
puts the example to different use. 
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time, he anti-copies her. On balance, Chad will be right more than he is wrong. So 
Chad’s opinion is not completely dependent on Beth’s, and he is reliable in general. Still, 
his opinion is worthless, so long as Beth’s opinion is already known. Provided we know, 
in advance, how Chad operates, learning his opinion tells us only whether he rolled a six 
with his die, which is not relevant to the issue at hand.14 
 What the preceding example illustrates is that an additional opinion can be eviden-
tially worthless even when it is not completely dependent and comes from a generally 
reliable source. This should not trouble us. As noted above, an outside opinion can be 
evidentially worthless for either of two reasons. It may come from an unreliable source, 
or it may be dependent on opinions that are already known. The interesting upshot of 
the Noisy Copying case is that an opinion can be worthless due to a mixture of these de-
fects. In such cases, the opinion in question will not provide any additional evidence. So, 
in effect, Chad’s opinion contains information about two sources – Beth and the die. 
Beth’s opinion is already known, and the die’s “opinion” isn’t relevant. 
 To conclude this section, it will be instructive to consider an example that combines 
group dependence and noisy copying. 
Random Copying: Before answering a logic problem, Chad flips a coin. If the result is heads, 
he copies Anna (whose opinions are right 90% of the time); if the result is tails, he copies Beth 
(whose opinions are also right 90% of the time, and whose opinions sometimes differ from 
Anna’s).15 
Given the setup, Chad is reliable. Like Anna and Beth, Chad’s opinions will be true 90% 
of the time. And, given the setup, Chad’s opinion is not completely dependent on An-
na’s or Beth’s, nor is his opinion completely dependent on the group. After all, his opin-
ion cannot be predicted (with certainty) solely on the basis of information about either or 
both of their opinions. However, Chad’s opinion is still evidentially worthless, so long as 
Anna’s and Beth’s opinions are already known. Why? Chad’s opinion carries infor-
mation about three things – Anna’s opinion, Beth’s opinion, and the result of the coin 
flip. Anna’s opinion and Beth’s opinion are known, and the coin flip isn’t relevant. 
 In this section, we have seen that, by analyzing dependence expectationally, we can 
accommodate a wide range of cases – parrot cases, cases of autonomous copying, cases 
involving people that employ identical methods, cases involving randomness, and cases 
involving dependence on groups. But, a wider project remains. The sorts of cases we 
have so far examined comprise only a small portion of the cases we might encounter in 
                                                
14 While Chad’s opinion is worthless, given Beth’s, the reverse is not true. Just as it can be 
helpful to obtain an original document, even after you have in hand a photocopy, it could be 
helpful to learn of Beth’s opinion even after you are aware of Chad’s. 
15 Thanks to an anonymous referee for proposing a version of this example.
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real life. Sometimes, the evidential value of an incoming opinion might be diminished, 
but not entirely eliminated, in light of other opinions we already know. A full treatment 
of belief dependence should do more than describe when an opinion is worthless; it 
should tell us just how much additional are opinions are worth. The remaining sections 
of this paper take preliminary steps toward completing this wider project. 
7 Belief Independence 
7.1 An Expectational Account of Complete Independence 
The previous section observes that two beliefs are completely dependent when, in effect, 
learning one belief tells you what the other is. In turn, we might be tempted to conclude 
that two beliefs are completely independent just in case information about the content of 
one of them tells you nothing at all about the likely content of the other. (Note that un-
der ordinary circumstances, separate coin flips will have this very same property.)  
But while this condition may capture an important kind of independence, it cannot 
be the kind of independence we are seeking. Why? Because the beliefs of sufficiently re-
liable thinkers will never ever meet this condition.16 To see this, suppose that Beth and 
Chad are known to be highly reliable: Each tends to answer correctly ⅚ of the time. 
From this alone, it follows that their judgments will be well correlated, in a certain sense: 
They will reach the same conclusion at least ⅔ of the time. And, therefore, information 
about the content of, say, Chad’s beliefs will tell us a lot about the likely content of 
Beth’s beliefs – solely because they are both so reliable. 
Still, this incomplete approach serves as a helpful step toward the goal of character-
izing complete independence of the salient kind. There are two kinds of cases we would 
like to be able to distinguish: On the one hand, there are cases in which Beth and Chad 
are correlated because one is copying the other, or because they are applying relevantly 
similar heuristics; on the other, there are cases in which Beth and Chad are correlated 
only because they are both reliable. The latter case is one of complete independence. 
With this observation in mind, we can offer the following. 
Complete Independence: C’s belief (about some proposition p) is completely independent of 
B’s belief (about p) just in case:  
(1) In advance, on the supposition that p is true, learning that B arrived at his belief (about p) does 
not raise or lower the probability that C will arrive at her belief (about p). 
(2) In advance, on the supposition that p is false, learning that B arrived at his belief (about p) does 
not raise or lower the probability that C will arrive at her belief (about p). 
When these conditions are met, the two beliefs – as long as B and C are reliable – provide 
more evidence than is provided by either belief, on its own. 
                                                
16 This point is due to Jeffrey (1987, p. 392). Goldman (2001, p. 101, fn. 18) also emphasizes 
this point. 
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Let’s take a look at a few variations on the usual example to see how this condition can 
be applied and to see just how much agreeing independent beliefs are worth.  
7.2 Variations on the Two-Person Case 
Suppose that Beth and Chad each answer correctly ⅚ of the time. And suppose that we 
learn that Beth arrived at p. At this point, our confidence in the truth of p is ⅚. Suppose 
that we are about to learn of Chad’s answer, and we are wondering: If Chad ends up 
agreeing with Beth, how much should our confidence in p increase?  
To answer this, we must assess whether Chad’s belief is completely independent of 
Beth’s. For simplicity, let’s suppose that p is true.17 In effect, we want to know how (if at 
all) the fact that Beth answered correctly bears on the probability that Chad will answer 
correctly. Given the setup, the probability that Chad gets it right would seem to be ⅚. 
When we take into account the fact that Beth answered correctly, does the probability of 
Chad’s success change? 
Of course, here it will depend on what else we know about Chad and Beth. Obvi-
ously, if we know that Chad blindly copies Beth always, then Chad’s probability of suc-
cess increases from ⅚ to 1. In other cases, the path forward may be less obvious. Sup-
pose we know that neither Beth nor Chad copies off the other. However, we also know 
that their teacher tends to teach certain topics extremely clearly and effectively, while 
teaching other topics somewhat confusingly. As a result, all the students tend to get the 
same problems right/wrong. In this case, too, learning that Beth got a given problem 
right would raise the probability that Chad also got it right (though it would not guaran-
tee Chad’s success). After all, if Beth answered correctly, the question is more likely to 
have been about the well-taught material, in which case, Chad is more likely to have an-
swered correctly. So here, Chad’s opinion would not be completely independent of 
Beth’s. 
One might wonder, then: Under what conditions would Chad’s opinion be inde-
pendent of Beth’s? Let’s suppose that we have elaborate track records for both students. 
Suppose we survey all of the cases in which Beth answered correctly and find that, in 
those cases, Chad answered correctly ⅚ of the time. Here, we would have good reason 
to think that the information about Beth’s having answered correctly has no bearing on 
Chad’s probability of success. So in this case, Chad’s opinion would be completely inde-
pendent of Beth’s.  
But we aren’t done. We began this section trying to determine how much the 
agreement of completely independent thinkers is worth. In this case, we want to know 
                                                
17 Strictly, to assess independence, we would have to consider the case where p is false, in ad-
dition. But in most cases (including the one at hand), it suffices to consider just one of the two 
cases.   
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how much support for p Chad’s completely independent agreement would provide. Re-
call that our all-things-considered confidence in p started out at ⅚, given only the fact 
that Beth arrived at p. Supposing that Chad independently comes to agree with Beth, 
how much should our confidence in p increase? There are two possibilities: Either they 
both are right (in which case p is true), or they both are wrong (in which case p is false). 
How likely are each of these options? Because their opinions are independent, the prob-
ability that both are right is ⅚ × ⅚ (which is equal to 25/36).18 The probability that both 
are wrong is simply ⅙ × ⅙ (which is equal to 1/36). Since these are the only two possibili-
ties, the final probability that both are right is 25/26 (which is approximately .96). And 
because p is true if and only if they’re both right, this result should be our new confi-
dence in p. So our confidence in p increases from about .83 to about .96 after we learn of 
Chad’s independent agreeing belief. More generally, the agreement of reliable, com-
pletely independent sources will always be worth more than that of completely depend-
ent sources. 
7.3 Returning to the Random Copying Case 
Here, it will be instructive to consider and respond to an objection, as the discussion 
may help to illustrate how the independence constraint outlined above is to be applied. 
The objection appeals to a certain version of the Random Copying case. In that example, 
Chad copies Anna when his coin lands heads and copies Beth when his coin lands tails. 
(Anna and Beth answer correctly 90% of the time, and answer independently from one 
another.) To make things somewhat more difficult, let’s suppose that Anna and Beth in 
fact disagree – Anna believes p, and Beth believes not-p. Will Chad’s opinion carry addi-
tional evidential weight? As we observed earlier, it is clear that Chad’s opinion 
shouldn’t carry any weight at all in this case. But it is not obvious that the proposed pic-
ture can deliver this result.19 
The tension is as follows. First, it seems clear that Chad is reliable, in a certain sense. 
He arrives at his views by randomly copying either of two very reliable sources. Second, 
it seems clear that Chad’s opinions are completely independent of the other opinions, in 
the expectational sense put forward previously. For, given that Anna and Beth disagree, 
Chad’s probability of answering correctly seems to be 50%, regardless of whatever new 
information is introduced. If indeed it is true that Chad is reliable and that his opinions 
are completely independent, the expectational account would say that his opinions are 
worth something, even after Anna’s and Beth’s opinions are known. Which they’re not. 
                                                
18 Let ‘B’ stand for the proposition that Beth is right; let ‘C’ stand for the proposition that 
Chad is right. We obtain: P(B&C) = P(B)×P(C|B). Independence tells us that P(C|B) = P(C), so: 
P(B&C)=P(B)×P(C). 
19 Thanks to an anonymous referee for offering a version of this objection.  
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The problem with the foregoing reasoning is an incongruity between the assessment 
of Chad as generally reliable and the judgment that his probability of answering correct-
ly is 50%. There are two ways of thinking about the case. Both are acceptable, and both 
have the consequence that Chad’s opinion is worthless. But we mustn’t mix and match. 
If it is part of the setup of the case that Anna and Beth disagree, then, given what we 
know, Chad’s opinion should not be seen as reliable. For Chad will answer correctly on-
ly when his coin leads him to defer to the accurate source, which will be half the time. 
On this way of looking at things, Chad’s opinion is indeed completely independent of 
Anna’s and Beth’s. But his opinion still lacks significance simply because it is unreliable. 
On the other hand, suppose we do not take Anna’s disagreement with Beth to be 
part of the setup of the case. With this more minimal setup in place, Chad’s opinion 
seems clearly to be reliable: He will answer correctly 90% of the time. Using this version 
of the case, however, Chad’s opinions will turn out not to be completely independent of 
the opinions of his peers. Let’s start by examining whether Chad’s opinion is completely 
independent of Anna’s opinion (leaving Beth out of it altogether). We just said that, from 
the setup alone, Chad’s probability of answering correctly is 90%. Now, suppose we 
learn that Anna answered correctly. Does this information raise or lower the probability 
that Chad answered correctly? Yes. Chad’s probability of success increases: If he copied 
Anna, then he answered correctly for certain; if he copied Beth, then the chance he an-
swered correctly is the usual 90% (since Beth’s answers are completely independent of 
Anna’s). Because Chad is equally likely to have copied either of them, the updated esti-
mate of Chad’s probability of success is the average of these values – 95%. So Chad’s 
probability rises from 90% to 95% when the new information about Anna’s opinion is 
accounted for. For this reason, his opinion is not completely independent of Anna’s – 
according to the expectational account. A totally parallel argument can show that Chad’s 
opinion is not completely dependent of Beth’s opinion either.  
But might Chad’s opinion be completely independent of Anna’s and Beth’s opinions, 
considered together?20 To see why not, recall that the baseline probability that Chad an-
swers correctly, given the setup of the case, is 90%. Now suppose we learn that Anna 
and Beth reached different conclusions. Does Chad’s probability of success change? Yes. 
Suddenly, the chance that Chad answers correctly falls drastically – to 50%. After all, 
Chad chose at random which of them to copy, and only one of them answered correctly. 
Because the new information that we gained about Anna’s and Beth’s opinions does 
                                                
20 Strictly speaking, the expectational constraint outlined earlier only describes what it takes 
for one opinion to be completely independent of another. To assess whether an opinion is com-
pletely independent of multiple opinions, we simply examine whether knowledge of the multiple 
opinions has any bearing on the content of the first opinion – both on the supposition that the 
proposition in question is true, and on the supposition that the proposition in question is false. 
-19- 
change Chad’s probability of success, Chad’s opinion is not completely independent of 
the opinions of Anna and Beth, considered together. So, in sum, the expectational ac-
count does not force us to say, implausibly, that Chad’s randomly copied opinion has 
epistemic significance. 
8 Partial Dependence 
So far, we have seen how to understand complete dependence and complete independ-
ence. But this still leaves out a lot of cases. And, it turns out that considering these cases 
– cases of partial dependence – introduces some interesting complications. 
We have seen that the agreement of reliable, completely independent sources pro-
vides more evidence than is provided by the agreement of comparably reliable, com-
pletely dependent sources. For this reason, it is tempting to conclude that the value of 
partially dependent agreement falls somewhere in between these extremes. And, often, 
this will be true. But not always. Certain forms of partial dependence can actually render 
the agreement of reliable sources even more valuable than that of comparably reliable 
completely independent sources. To see this, we will start with a simple case, where the 
evidential value of partially dependent agreement does land in between that of com-
pletely dependent and completely independent agreement. Next, we will consider the 
more unusual sort of case. 
The following case can be described as ‘two against two’ – with two completely in-
dependent sources believing one thing, and two partially dependent sources believing 
the opposite. Suppose that Beth and Chad – who, as usual, each answer correctly ⅚ of 
the time – occasionally copy each other (and are therefore partially dependent). In addi-
tion, suppose that Dawn and Eric also happen to be in the same logic class. Dawn and 
Eric are undercover logicians, so, for any question, they know what the right answer is. 
But in order to keep their identities secret, they answer incorrectly ⅙ of the time by us-
ing a six-sided die. Each keeps a personal die and answers incorrectly whenever ‘6’ is 
rolled – so Dawn’s and Eric’s answers are completely independent. 
You are sitting in the center of all four of them, and you know all of the above infor-
mation. On this particular problem, you can see that Beth and Chad arrived at p, while 
Dawn and Eric both arrived at ~p. You do not know anything about this logic problem, 
and you did not see the dice that were discreetly rolled. Which answer should you go 
with? As it turns out, the kind of partial dependence exhibited by Beth and Chad ren-
ders their shared belief less significant than the shared opinion of Dawn and Eric, which 
makes it reasonable for you to be more confident of ~p. A simple argument can show 
this. 
We know that something somewhat unlikely happened. Either Beth and Chad both 
arrived at the wrong answer, or else two fair dice both came up ‘6.’ Which of these is 
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more likely? The second possibility involves the coincidence of two unlikely events, 
which have no bearing on one another – Dawn’s rolling ‘6,’ and Eric’s rolling ‘6’. The 
first possibility, in contrast, involves the coincidence of two unlikely events that fre-
quently tend to coincide – Beth's erring and Chad's erring. Because one sometimes cop-
ies off of the other, it is – relatively speaking – not that uncommon for Beth and Chad to 
get the same problem wrong. This is the better explanation of what we have observed, 
so Dawn and Eric’s answer of ~p is more likely to be correct. So, in this case, the agree-
ment of partially dependent sources was not worth as much as that of comparably relia-
ble, completely independent sources. 
If we were to take this example as a guide, we might well conclude that the agree-
ment of completely independent sources is always worth more than that of comparably 
reliable partially dependent sources. But, as noted earlier, this turns out not to be the 
case. Partial dependence, like complete dependence, comes in two main varieties: Ordi-
nary partial dependence obtains whenever two sources agree more often than compara-
bly reliable independent sources would. Perverse partial dependence obtains when two 
sources agree less often than comparably reliable independent sources would. In the ex-
ample above, the dependence between Beth’s and Chad’s beliefs took the ordinary form: 
They agreed with each other more often Dawn and Eric do. But, one might wonder, 
what would happen if two reliable sources exhibited partial perverse dependence? How 
much would the agreement of two reliable contrarians be worth? Intriguingly, it turns 
out that the agreement of such thinkers is worth more than that of even completely in-
dependent sources. 
Suppose that Beth and Chad are contrarians, always looking for opportunities to 
disagree with one another. But they do not always disagree: On the whole, each is right 
⅚ of the time – so they still must agree quite often. However, let’s suppose that they dis-
agree as much as they possibly could, given their reliability: ⅔ of the time, they agree 
and are both correct; the other ⅓ of the time, they end up disagreeing, with Beth’s being 
correct in exactly half of those remaining cases (so each is still wrong ⅙ of the time over-
all). Given this setup, it follows that Chad and Beth never agree on a wrong answer: At 
least one of them is always right. Immediately, it follows that their agreement is quite 
valuable. Given the setup, it is clear that, when these two do agree, we can be totally cer-
tain that their answer is correct. 
One may wonder about what sort of lesson should be taken from this observation. 
For one thing, the example is unrealistic: After all, how often can we be totally sure, in 
advance, that two thinkers could not both settle on the wrong conclusion? This seems to 
me to be a fair complaint. In response, it is worth noting that even if an extreme case like 
the one described is unlikely to crop up in real life (that is, a case where agreement guar-
antees truth), milder instances of the same phenomenon (reliable sources exhibiting per-
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verse partial dependence) almost certainly do. Imagine, for example, that Chad and Beth 
are not contrarians, but instead have complementary skill sets – such that they almost 
never make mistakes in the same area. This does not seem unrealistic, and (depending 
on the details) it could be that the two rarely, if ever, agree upon wrong answers – be-
cause every question falls in an area where at least one of them is quite strong. In such a 
case, it would be reasonable for us to be quite confident of any answers the two do agree 
about. While perverse dependence (of reliable sources) may be somewhat rarer than or-
dinary dependence, it still seems worth taking seriously.  
The following table summarizes the observations made in these last few sections. 
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~ .83 n/a21 
To conclude this section, it will be useful to look at another toy example to see how these 
observations can be applied to realistic situations. Though we cannot say anything hard 
and fast about many real-world cases, the understanding of dependence and independ-
ence that has been developed here may help to highlight the kinds of questions that are 
relevant, in thinking about the degree of support outside opinions provide.  
Moved by Argument: Suppose that Beth and Chad agree because Beth came up with 
an argument and Chad found it convincing. And suppose that they disagree with Anna, 
who has her own argument, but has not yet tried it on anyone. How much of a boost 
does Chad's agreement provide? 
To simplify matters, a first assumption to make is that Anna, Beth, and Chad are re-
liable – and equally so – with respect to the topic under dispute. Obviously, if the topic 
is, say, politics, or philosophy, or religion, then questions of a person’s reliability will be 
                                                
21 If Chad always anti-copies Beth, then the two will never agree. Moreover, if Beth’s reliabil-
ity is ⅚ in such a case, then Chad’s reliability will necessarily be only ⅙. So the anti-copying case 
is incompatible with the setup. 
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quite difficult, if not impossible, to settle. But such assumptions are necessary if we are 
to say anything substantive about how the issue of dependence interacts with cases like 
these. 
The next questions to ask concern dependence, particularly that between Beth and 
Chad: First, if Beth had offered a good argument, how likely is it that Chad would have 
been persuaded? Second, if Beth had offered a bad argument, how likely is it that Chad 
would have been persuaded? In answering these questions, we can’t use the fact that 
Chad ended up agreeing with Beth – since these questions are to be evaluated in advance 
of their agreement. However, we can use certain facts about the people involved. If, for 
example, Beth is known to be especially charismatic, or if Chad tends to be a contrarian 
around Beth, then our answers to the above questions should accommodate these data. 
To the extent that we expected, in advance, that Beth would surely convince Chad (no 
matter how good or bad her argument was), Chad's agreement will add little credibility 
to the proposition they jointly hold. So Anna’s position and Beth’s/Chad’s position will 
be on a par, epistemically. To the extent that we expected, in advance, that Chad could 
well have disagreed with Beth (despite being just as reliable as she) Chad's agreement 
will make their position more credible – and it will be reasonable to place more confi-
dence in it than in Anna’s position. The size of the advantage that Beth’s and Chad’s 
shared view enjoys over Anna’s view will depend (in part) upon how likely it was that 
Chad would have disagreed. 
9 Application to Credences 
So far, we have only talked about dependence and independence exhibited by beliefs. But 
some epistemologists prefer to think and talk in terms of credences (degrees of confi-
dence), rather than in terms of all-or-nothing beliefs. Within this framework, one should 
consider the question of how the credences of others should affect one’s own credenc-
es.22 A complete answer to this question would include some treatment of dependence 
and independence. So it is well worth pointing out that the expectational account of de-
pendence and independence discussed in the previous sections can be applied to a 
framework that uses credences in place of beliefs – with minimal modifications. Here are 
suitably modified versions of the principles earlier presented. 
Complete Dependence for Credences: C’s credence of c (in some proposition p) is complete-
ly dependent on B’s credence of b (in p) just in case it is rational to be certain, in advance, that 
C will have a credence of c (in p) if B has a credence of b (in p). When this condition is met, the 
                                                
22 For a general theory of how to aggregate credences, see Easwaran et al (2016). They do not 
discuss the kind of dependence we have focused on. For this reason, the expectational account of 
dependence and independence developed here may serve to complement to their well developed 
view.  
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two credences provide just as much evidence for or against p as is provided by B’s credence, 
on its own. 
Complete Independence for Credences: C’s credence of c (in some proposition p) is com-
pletely independent of B’s credence of b (in p) just in case:  
(1) On the supposition that p is true, the fact that B has credence b in p does not raise or lower the 
probability that C will have credence c in p. 
(2) On the supposition that p is false, the fact that B has credence b in p does not raise or lower the 
probability that C will have credence c in p. 
When these conditions are met, the credences of reliable sources provide more evidence than 
is provided by either credence, on its own. 
Applying the first of these principles to an example will help to bring out an important 
feature of the expectational account – a feature we largely ignored in our earlier discus-
sion. 
To the usual logic exam setup, we add the following details. Beth’s confidence in her 
answers is sometimes .9, and never higher. The answers she has .9 confidence in are the 
answers she is most sure about. And, Beth always makes a written note of her exact cre-
dence next to whichever answer she selects. Chad can see Beth’s notes and uses the fol-
lowing procedure: When he sees that Beth is at her highest level of .9, he simply copies 
her answer, coming to have a .9 credence in that answer as well; but when he sees that 
Beth is somewhere below .9, he works through the problem himself, and comes to have 
a credence of .8 in whichever answer he arrives at. 
 With these details in place, one might ask: Do Chad’s opinions provide evidence be-
yond that provided by Beth’s opinions? Answer: It depends. On the one hand, if Beth 
and Chad both end up with a credence of .9 in some proposition p, then, according to the 
expectational account, Chad’s opinion is completely dependent on Beth’s – and, there-
fore, it provides no additional evidence for p. On the other hand, if Beth and Chad both 
end up with a credence of only .8 in p, then Chad’s opinion would provide some addi-
tional support for p beyond that provided by Beth’s credence. What this package of ob-
servations illustrates is that opinions, rather than sources, are what should be assessed 
for dependence or independence, in a given case. One specific opinion can be completely 
dependent on another even when the sources of those opinions sometimes arrive at their 
views independently. In a similar vein, one specific opinion can be completely inde-
pendent of another, even when the source of that opinion sometimes copies the other 
source. Though it is sometimes useful to speak of “the agreement of depend-
ent/independent sources” to summarize general observations, it is important to remem-
ber that, strictly speaking, opinions, not sources, are the proper unit of analysis. 
10 Conclusion 
In some sense, it is clear that the numbers count. That is, it is clear the number of think-
-24- 
ers on a given side of a disputed issue is typically relevant to the degree of support their 
opinions provide. It has often been suggested that the extent to which these opinions are 
dependent or independent also has substantial epistemic import in such situations. In 
this paper, we have seen how to characterize the type of dependence that can play this 
role. Though many cases that illustrate the operative phenomenon tend to involve de-
pendence of a causal variety, we have seen that dependence of the relevant kind should 
be understood expectationally, not causally – though causal relations are a particularly 
salient way of producing expectational dependence. Additionally, we have seen that we 
can make sense of expectational dependence regardless of whether we think in terms of 
credences or in terms of all-or-nothing beliefs. Though in any real-life circumstance, ap-
plying the account discussed will inevitably be an inexact science, a greater understand-
ing of the nature of the relevant kind of dependence and independence puts us in a posi-
tion to understand better how and when the numbers count.23 
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